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COMPETING STATE AND FEDERAL ROLES
IN CONSUMER CREDIT LAW
CARL FELSENFELD*
An important problem confronting those in the consumer
credit industry is the absence of a cohesive body of law. This im-
pairs creditors of all types and also results in unequal treatment
of consumers. In a comprehensive study Mfr. Felsenfeld analyzes
the evolution from purely state regulation of consumer credit to
a combination of state and federal control. The author suggests
that, despite certain merits of local regulation, the consumer credit
area may well be preempted by future federal legislation.
I
INTRODUCTION
T HE first function of this article is reportorial: legal control
of consumer credit has to a significant extent passed from
the states to the Federal Government.- Its second function is one
of prediction: that the process is continuing and will accelerate.
Finally, there will be some modest commentary about this shift:
it may not be too bad.
II
STATE-FEDERAL RELATION
The explosion in consumer credit volume in recent years
is too well-known to require elaboration here. In the last ten
years alone, the outstanding volume has more than doubled, from
$56 billion in 1960 to over $120 billion in 1969.2 In general, de-
spite the existence of consumer finance companies of national
and even international scope, the process of extending money or
credit to individuals has traditionally been considered a local op-
eration. Without major discontent, this economic activity has
* Member, New York Bar; Assistant General Counsel, CIT Financial Corp.;
consultant to the Special Committee on Retail Installment Sales, Consumer
Credit, Small Loans and Usury of the Natl Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws. B.A., 1949, Dartmouth College; J.D., 1954, Columbia Uni-
versity.
1 See Dole, Consumer Class Actions Under Recent Consumer Credit Legisla-
tion, 44 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 80 (1969); Harper, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code: A
Critical Analysis, id. at 53; Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit
Reform, id. at 1; Littlefield, Preserving Consumer Defenses: Plugging the Loophole
in the New UCCC, id. at 272; Murphy, Lawyers for the Poor View the UCCC, id.
at 29S; Schrag, Bleak House 1963: A Report on Consumer Test Litigation, id. at
115. 2 56 Fed. Res. Bull. A-S4 (Feb. 1970).
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operated subject to the laws of the several states with federal
intrusions only in certain restricted areas.
Moreover, consumer credit is a highly regulated field. Few
businesses operate under the complex minutiae of legal supervi-
sion to which consumer credit is subject. The fundamental laws
controlling the extension of credit are, of course, the usury laws
which exist in some form in every state. There is no federal law
of usury,' nor is there any semblance of uniformity among the
states on this subject.'
The numerous qualifications of and exceptions to the usury
laws which have facilitated widespread expansion of consumer
credit have likewise been creatures of state law. Since the rel-
atively low rate ceilings of the usury laws were designed for
purposes other than mass consumer credit and have proven in-
sufficient for that purpose, new legal devices have been created
within which this operation could function.' In the area of credit
selling, the fundamental legal tool has been the "time-price doc-
trine," which essentially deems that time sales are not the sort
of debt forbearance to which the usury laws apply. The land-
mark decision in this area is Hogg v. Ruffner" which, while a
United States Supreme Court opinion, is an interpretation of the
usury law of the State of Indiana. There the Court held that
the time sale on a piece of land was not subject to the interest
rate ceilings of the usury laws. However, the wide latitude in
setting rates permitted sellers under the time price doctrine has
been considerably restricted by the various statutes regulating
instalment selling presently in effect in most states. 7
Loan laws similarly have been revised to permit the lending
of money at liberalized rates beyond the basic usury law restric-
tions. Research by the Russell Sage Foundation led to the enact-
ment of small loan laws or their equivalent in almost all states.'
Such legislation enabled consumer loans to be made subject to
3 See text accompanying note 56 infra. Federal interest laws do exist in
specialized areas, such as the freedom of preferred ship mortgages from any rate
ceiling. 46 U.S.C. § 926 (1964).
4 B. Curran, Trends in Consumer Credit Legislation 15 (1965) describes a
range of state usury rates from as low as 4% to a high of 30% per annum.
5 The interrelationship of rates and credit is discussed in detail in J. Chapman
& R. Shay, The Consumer Finance Industry (1967). See also The Conference on
Personal Finance Law, The Realities of Maximum Ceilings on Interest and Finance
Charges (1968).
6 66 U.S. (1 Black) 115 (1861). The leading English cases are Beete v.
Bidgood, 108 Eng. Rep. 792 (K.B. 1827); Floyer v. Edwards, 98 Eng. 995 (K.B.
1774).
7 See notes 102-03 infra for the applicable New York statutes.
S See D. Robinson & L. Nugent, Regulation of the Small Loan Business (1935).
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state administrative supervision under particularized rate ceil-
ings.9
Stemming from these two basic building blocks of credit,
the states have enacted a variegated umbrella covering virtually
all aspects of consumer credit. A partial list includes: the licens-
ing and examination of lenders and other credit grantors, 10 the
control of debt collection practices," the regulation of credit
unions,"- bank consumer loan departments 13 and, of course, the
perfection and enforcement of security devices. 4 Related sta-
tutes in such areas as consumer credit insurance,' 5 credit cards"0
and civil remedies 1'7 round out the picture.
This emphasis on state law is not intended to mean that the
impact of the Federal Government has been completely absent
in consumer credit. Its presence has, however, been clearly sec-
ondary to the role of state law. In evaluating the position of the
Federal Government, it should be noted at the outset that the
general overlay of federal law represented by such statutes of
general application as the Federal Trade Commission Act'8 and
the Sherman Act'" apply to the consumer credit industry as well
as to other forms of interstate commerce.20
Other federal laws, although not designed specifically for
the regulation of consumer credit, affect that industry somewhat
more directly. Among these are statutes creating and regulating
such credit-granting institutions as national banks21 and federal
9 Curran, supra, note 4, at 16. Miss Curran indicates that such legislation
exists in every state except Arkansas.
10 See N.Y. Banking Law, §§ 340-65 (McKinney 1950); id. §§ 491-502
(McKinney Supp. 1969) among many others.
11 New York forbids the practice of arranging debtors' obligations for a fee
(known as debt-pooling or debt pro-rating). N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 455-57
(McKinney 196S). Other states generally either forbid this practice or subject
it to regulation.
12 See N.Y. Banking Law §§ 450-80 (McKinney 1950).
13 N.Y. Banking Law § 108 (McKinney Supp. 1969).
14 These are contained principally in Art. 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Some specialized statutes regulating consumer credit also cut across this area, as
does the Maryland Retail Installment Sales Act, Md. Ann. Code art. 83, §§ 141-44
(1969).
I5 The National Association of Insurance Commissioners has drafted a Model
Credit Insurance Bill that has been enacted in 30 states and the District of
Columbia. See Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 38-249 (1969); 40 Pa. Stat. tit. 40,
§ 1007.1 (Supp. 1969).
16 N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 512 (McKinney 1968).
17 See N.Y. CPLR § 3201 (1963).
18 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-9S (1964).
19 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964).
20 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
"1 12 U.S.C. §§ 21-215b (1964).
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credit unions.2 Even here, however, there is the presence of
state law and a recognition of the dominant role it plays in
creating the structure of the credit system. Significant is the ty-
ing of the national banks' interest rates to the rates authorized
by state law23 as well as relating other national bank powers to
the permitted operations of state banks.2
Two important areas where the Federal Government has
assumed major responsibility deserve special mention because
of their effect upon consumer credit as well as related financial
operations. The first of these involves the power of the Federal
Reserve Board (FRB), through its various fiscal activities, to
affect the supply of money. Although not the only factor in the
economy influencing the money supply, the operation of the FRB
is probably the most significant. For present purposes, it serves
as one prime example of the constitutional power of the Federal
Government to reach and affect the laws dealing with credit.-- In
evaluating the function of the Government in this area, one of
our first concerns must be with the Constitution and its grants
of power. The power of Congress over money is a matter that
will be pursued further.
The second major federal presence in consumer credit as
an adjunct to a more generalized federal function is in the field
of bankruptcy. Here again a broad grant of constitutional power
will be found to supply the specific basis for federal entry into
the field of consumer credit. As with the powers of the FRB,
federal presence in bankruptcy has become a traditional and
accepted federal role. Undoubtedly this is primarily because the
Congress was quick to exercise the bankruptcy power granted
it in the Constitution 26 by enacting implementing legislation.
Without this, it may be assumed that the states would have had
the same freedom to enact laws governing insolvency as they
now have to control consumer credit.2 7
It is paradoxical that the major laws permitting and regu-
lating the creation of debt are state products while the body
of law authorizing the release from debt is of federal origin.
22 12 U.S.C. §§ 1751-75 (1964).
23 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1964).
24 State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d
863 (1958); Boatmen's Nat'I Bank v. Hughes, 385 I]1. 431, 53 N.E.2d 403 (1944).
25 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 5. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Henwood, 307 U.S. 247
(1939).
26 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
27 See, e.g., In re Wisconsin Builders Supply Co., 136 F. Supp. 439 (D. Wis.
1955), rev'd on other grounds, 239 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S.
985 (1957).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 45:487
CONSUMER CREDIT LAW
Since uniformity in the latter is generally deemed a desirable if
not necessary legal element, one may fairly ask why uniformity
should not be equally appropriate to the former.28 Perhaps at
least one benefit of uniformity can be observed at this point by
comparing the national Bankruptcy Act29 to the multitude of
inconsistent state laws governing insolvency distributions or as-
signments for the benefit of creditors.30 The Bankruptcy Act is
a generally well understood statute and a reasonable number of
practitioners rightly consider themselves expert in its operation.
Conversely, it is a courageous lawyer indeed who suggests that
he has any real overall understanding of state insolvency laws,
or even of their operating principles. To the extent that a broad
understanding of law is a desirable objective, uniformity clearly
serves this end.3'
It is also possible that the separation of federal bankruptcy
laws from state credit laws may have some influence on the ap-
parent lack of guiding policy principles. For example, the factors
causing a consumer to get into debt have not yet been rational-
ized with those enabling his release from debt. Issues concerning
the propriety of debt creation (including such matters as the
proper level of interest rates as determinative of who shall be
granted credit) have not really been examined as correlatives of
the problems of bankruptcy discharges. Concern with rising
bankruptcy and efforts to control the easy availability of bank-
ruptcy 2 exist simultaneously with efforts, such as the draft-
ing of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC), to increase
the availability of credit. Certainly a uniform set of laws would
have some beneficial effect in diminishing the number of such
inconsistent programs.
Up to now the discussion has centered on the tangential ef-
fect upon consumer credit of broad federal legislation directed
toward other economic problems. Until recent months, direct
intervention by the Federal Government into the control and
regulation of consumer credit activities as such has been rela-
28 It may be noted that the Constitution itself requires bankruptcy laws to
be "uniform .. . throughout the United States." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, c. 4.
2D 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1200 (1964).
Zo See, e.g., StelIwagen v. CIum, 245 U.S. 605 (1918).
31 The author has suggested elsewhere that a major argument for uniformity
is that laws will be better understood. Felsenfeld, Uniform, Uniformed and Unitary
Laws Regulating Consumer Credit, 37 Fordham L. Rev. 209, 223 (1968).
32 See Twinem, Reduce Unnecessary Personal Bankruptcies: Amend the Bank-
ruptcy Act, 23 Legal Aid Brief Case 252 (1965); Comment, The Problem of
Consumer Bankruptcy: Is Amendment of the Bankruptcy Act the Answer? 63
Mich. L. Rev. 1449 (1965).
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tively rare. (However, recent events have radically altered this.)
One such entry was the President's Executive Order during World
War II directing the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System to take action to restrict overextensions of consumer
credit.33 Issued pursuant to general executive powers contained
in the Trading with the Enemy Act,3" the Order was designed
both to protect the availability of goods for war production and
to guard against inflation. The FRB issued its regulation W
pursuant to this Order and thereby controlled down-payments
and lengths of term in designated consumer credit transactions.
However, regulation W was suspended after the Korean War."
In 1951, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) promul-
gated a set of trade practice rules applicable to retail instalment
sales of motor vehicles. 6 These rules bear some resemblance
to many state statutes regulating such sales by requiring certain
specified elements of the instalment sale (such as the cash price,
the finance charge and other related charges-but not the an-
nual percentage rate of charge) to be disclosed to the buyer.37 In
addition, the rules contain certain controls on the writing of in-
surance in connection with motor vehicle salesYs As far as it can
be determined, these rules have never been enforced and, al-
though they are still in effect, they probably are preempted by
the more detailed and comprehensive requirements of the Truth
in Lending Law discussed below. 9
Other FTC action in the area of consumer credit includes
the promulgation, in 1967, of a set of guides to deter deception
in debt collections.4" The essence of these rules is that one en-
gaged in debt collection must make his purpose known and not
use concealment, misrepresentation or any other form of decep-
tion in his efforts to collect an obligation. While the enforcement
of these rules has been primarily against collection agencies in
the past, the FTC announced in January 1970 that four firms
actually in the business of extending consumer credit were en-
gaged in questionable practices under these guides. Undoubtedly
.3 Exec. Order No. 8843, 3 C.F.R. § 164 (1969).
34 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 1-44 (1964).
35 Pursuant to a joint resolution, Congress has forbidden the Federal Reserve
System to exercise consumer credit controls pursuant to the Executive Order except
during a war or a national emergency declared by the President. 61 Stat. 921
(1947) (now 12 U.S.C. § 249 (1964)).
36 16 C.F.R. § 197 (1969).
37 Id. § 197.2.38 Id. § 197.5.
39 See Part III infra.
40 16 C.F.R. § 237 (1969).
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this action is a part of the growing federal interest in the prob-
lems of the consumer generally and consumer credit in partic-
ular. The next section will analyze this new interest.
III
THE CONSUMER CREDIT PROTECTION ACT
Clearly the most significant and important incursion by the
Federal Government into the state province of consumer credit
was the passage in 1968 of the Consumer Credit Protection Act
(CCPA). 1 While best known for its provisions relating to truth-
in-lending, the CCPA actually contains considerably more that
is of significance to the consumer credit industry.
The CCPA consists of four titles. Title I deals principally
with disclosure and, itself, is called the Truth in Lending Act 2
An outgrowth of the work of Senator Paul H. Douglas, who in-
troduced the first bill on this subject in 1960, the keystone of
the statute is its requirement that the cost of credit be disclosed
to the debtor in terms of simple annual interest. Despite its
title, the Truth in Lending Act also covers instalment sales and
revolving credit transactions in addition to pure loans.4 3 It is
applicable to consumer and agricultural transactions but not
business or commercial credit 44 Except for transactions secured
by real estate, it excludes extensions of credit in excess of the
sum of $25,000.41 In addition to the required disclosure of simple
annual interest, the Act forces creditors to disclose, in prescribed
form, the other significant details of the credit extension. There
are provisions regulating consumer credit advertising as well as
authorization for consumer debtors to rescind certain nonpur-
chase money real estate transactions within three days after the
transaction has been consummated. 46
Title II of the CCPA, Extortionate Credit Transactions, is
a form of federal criminal usury law. However, rather than out-
lawing loans above a specified rate, its penalties are applicable to
loans made with the "understanding ... that delay in making
repayment or failure to make repayment could result in the use
of violence or other criminal means to cause harm to the person,
41 Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (May 29, 1968), substantially codified in
15 U.S.C. § 1601-77 and 18 U.S.C. 891-96 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968) [hereinafter
CCPAI.
42 CCPA § 101.
43 CCPA §§ 127-28, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1637-38 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
44 Id. §§ 103(h), 15 U.S.C. § 1639 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
41 Id. § 104 (3), 15 U.S.C. § 1603 (3) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
46 Id. § 125, 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
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reputation, or property of any person."4 Unlike the typical state
usury law, which is tied to a specific rate or series of rates, Title
II makes a loan illegal, regardless of rate, if tied to a threat of
illegal collection methods. In a prosecution under this Title, a
finding that more than 45 per cent simple interest was charged
is one element of several that may result in prima facie evidence
that the credit extension was extortionate,4 but an excessive
rate is not a necessary element of the crime.
Title III restricts an individual's earnings subject to gar-
nishment to 25 per cent of his weekly earnings or the amount by
which such earnings exceed thirty times the federal minimum
hourly wage, whichever is less. However, Title III will not become
effective until July 1, 1970."9
The last section, Title IV, provides for the establishment
of a Commission on Consumer Finance to be composed of three
senators, three representatives and three members of the public.
The Commission is directed to "study and appraise the func-
tioning and structure of the consumer finance industry, as well
as consumer credit transactions generally""5 and report to the
President and Congress by January 1, 1971.
A striking feature of the first three Titles of the CCPA is
that the areas they cover have previously been left almost en-
tirely to state law. The requirement of disclosure of credit trans-
action terms appears in some form in almost every state, either
in its laws regulating consumer loans,"' instalment selling,52 or
general lending. 3 Similarly, criminal usury laws54 as well as
garnishment laws5' have traditionally existed on the state rather
than federal level. Naturally, the CCPA contains appropriate
provisions to the effect that it will essentially annul any con-
flicting state law."6
The version of the CCPA that first passed the House of
47 Id. § 891 (6), 18 U.S.C. § 891 (6) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).48 Id. § 892, 18 U.S.C. § 892 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
49 Id. § 504.
50 Id. § 404. At this time the Commission consists of Senators Sparkman
(D., Ala.), Proxmire (D., Wis.) and Tower (R., Tex.); Representatives Patman
(D., Tex.), Sullivan (D., Mo.) and Halpern (R., N.Y.); Messrs. Robert Braucher
of the Harvard Law School, Robert W. Johnson, Professor of Finance, Purdue
University, and Ira M. Milstein of the New York Bar.
51 See, e.g., N.Y. Banking Law § 353 (McKinney 1950).
52 See, e.g., N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law 402(3)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1969) incor-
porating the Truth in Lending Act by reference.
53 See, e.g., N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 399-B (1967).
54 See, e.g., N.Y. Penal Law § 190.40 (McKinney 1967).
55 See N.Y. CPLR § 6201 (McKinney 1963).
56 CCPA § 111 (a), 15 U.S.C. § 1610 (a) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
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Representatives went even further in invading the state domain. 7
Among the provisions deleted before final passage was a proposed
national usury law limiting the interest rate that may be charged
in any extension of credit to a natural person to 18 per cent per
annum.5 It is part of the thesis of this article that this abortive
effort to establish a national usury law is more a harbinger of
things to come than a mere legal curiosity of historical interest.
It is not inconceivable that the most significant part of the
CCPA will turn out to be the National Commission on Consumer
Finance established under Title IV. 9 The Commission is funded
and is now developing a professional staff. In view of the magni-
tude of its task, it seems probable that the January 1, 1971
report date will be deferred. One can only speculate on the even-
tual contents of that report. A significant factor that must affect
its conclusions will be the actual national experience with the
CCPA, particularly Title I, the Truth in Lending Act. This has
been effective only since July 1, 1969, and there is little evidence
of any substantial impact on the consumer credit structure. °
However, the presence of the CCPA has not been unduly dis-
pleasing to either creditor or debtor and, barring presently un-
expected developments, it seems unlikely that there will be a
recommendation that the Federal Government retreat from its
advance into the consumer credit field. A report recommending
increased federal presence, which on balance seems more likely
than not, will have an important effect on the state-federal bal-
ance in this area."1
IV
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CONSUMER
CREDIT PROTECTION ACT
Allied with the tradition that consumer credit is an activity
properly subject to state control is a generally prevailing atti-
57 H.R. 11601, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), particularly § 203(1).
58 Id.
59 See note 50 supra.
60 1969 Board of Governors, Fed. Res. Sys. Ann. Rep., Truth-in-Lending,
Rep. No. 26A (Jan. 20, 1970). A somewhat contrary analysis appears in Wheat,
The E.perience of Oklahoma Banks With Truth-in-Lending and the Oklahoma
Consumer Credit Code, 54 Cons. Fin. Laws 5 (1970).
01 See Johnson, Economic Rationale of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code,
23 J. of Fin. 303 (1968). However, it is interesting to note that 2 of the 3 public
members of the Commission have strong ties to the Uniform Consumer Credit
Code which is a document committed to the dominance of state law. Professor
Braucher served on the Special Committee of the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws that drafted the Code, and Professor Johnson,
who served as Reporter-Economist to that Committee, was largely responsible for
the economic rationale that underlies it.
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tude that it is essentially a local or intrastate activity not subject
to federal legislation. Thus, the constitutional basis for the CCPA
must be examined.
Two recent cases have sustained the constitutionality of
Title II, Extortionate Credit Transactions. In United States v.
De Lutro62 and United States v. Biancofiori, 3 Title II was up-
held against the challenge that it did not affect interstate com-
merce. In De Lutro the attack on the statute was accompanied
by an allegation that, even if some interstate commerce was af-
fected, the statute was unconstitutional because it did not require
a showing of an effect on interstate commerce as an element of
the crime. Similarly, in Biancofiori, it was asserted that the al-
leged acts of the actual defendants did not affect interstate
commerce.
In finding that interstate commerce was sufficiently affected
to sustain Title II, the attitude of both courts is well illustrated
by the majority opinion in De Lutro:
In this age of the jet plane, superhighway and wide-area phone
call, when our daily newspapers and periodicals over the past few
years have repeatedly publicized large-scale "loan-sharking" ac-
tivities on the part of organized criminal elements, the effect on
interstate commerce would appear to be too obvious to require
any comment. Indeed, it is not even necessary to rely upon such
widespread general knowledge. The record before Congress con-
tains specific references to such interstate impactY4
Additional support for the courts' findings that defendants
acts affected interstate commerce is found in Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States,6" a case that gives great breadth to
the commerce clause. The Biancofiori court, quoting Heart of
Atlanta, stated that "the power of Congress to promote interstate
commerce also includes the power to regulate the local inci-
dents ...which might have a substantial and harmful effect
upon that commerce."6
Both courts utilized Congress' general bankruptcy power
as a second basis for validating Title II. De Lutro followed the
sensible reasoning of the conference report on the CCPA that
criminal lending will result in obligations not susceptible to being
discharged in bankruptcy. 7 Thus, the court concluded that the
62 CCH Cons. Cred. Guide ff 99,806, at 89,777 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 1970).
63 Id. 11 99,796, at 89,771 (7th Cir. Feb. 2, 1970).
64 Id. II 99,806, at 89,778.
65 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
66 Id. at 258, quoted in CCII Cons. Cred. Guide 9 99,796, at 89,772
137 H.R. Rep. No. 1397, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1968).
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Federal Government is within its constitutional bankruptcy powers
in protecting the bankruptcy laws by making such extortionate
loans a federal crime. It is interesting to note that the purpose
clause of Title II contains specific references to interstate com-
merce and bankruptcy.0s This was, of course, utilized in the
opinions approving Title II.09 Title III, on garnishment, contains
similar specific constitutional bases in its purpose clause.70 The
purpose clause of Title I, however, contains no direct reference
to any constitutional authorization:
The Congress finds that economic stabilization would be enhanced
and the competition among the various financial institutions and
other firms engaged in the extension of consumer credit would
be strengthened by the informed use of credit. The informed use
of credit results from an awareness of the cost thereof by con-
sumers. It is the purpose of this title to assure a meaningful dis-
closure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to
compare more readily the various credit terms available to him
and avoid the uninformed use of credit.71
Whether this is sufficient to support federal legislation con-
trolling a $250 loan by a small local finance company to a con-
sumer in downtown Boondocks is a question open to speculation.
Obviously, the absence of a specific reference in the statute to
interstate commerce or bankruptcy does not foreclose a court
from drawing upon these as sources of congressional authority.72
It would seem that the same rationale supporting the application
of these two sources of congressional power to Titles II and III
would have similar application to Title I. The opportunities for
wide-ranging consumer credit are continually growing and re-
ceiving public attention. It would be surprising if even a single,
isolated consumer credit transaction were found free of all rea-
sonable connection with interstate commerce.
Another source of congressional power, as yet judicially un-
tested, may also support Title I. The power of Congress to "coin
Money, [and] regulate the Value thereof"73 has been construed
to permit Congress to take appropriate steps to protect the bank-
ing system.74 Since developments in consumer credit and the
08 CCPA § 201.
69 United States v. Biancofiori, CCH Cons. Cred. Guide ff 99,796, at 89,772
(7th Cir. Feb. 2, 1970); United States v. De Lutro, id. f1 99,806, at 89,778-79
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 1970).
7o CCPA § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 1671 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
71 Id. § 102, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
72 White v. United States, 399 F.2d 813 (8th Cir. 1968).
73 U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
74 United States v. Doherty, 18 F. Supp. 793 (D. Neb. 1937), aft'd, 94 F.2d
495 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 658 (1938).
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banking system often affect each other, the relationship between
the two fields is probably substantial enough for an exercise of
congressional power in the consumer credit area based upon the
monetary regulation power.
Justice Marshall once commented that "we must never
forget that it is a constitution we are expounding" and "that a
government, intrusted with such ample powers, on the due execu-
tion of which the happiness and prosperity of the nation so vitally
depends, must also be intrusted with ample means for their
execution." 5 This concept has been a traditional basis for expan-
sion of congressional power through judicial construction. There-
fore, in a difficult case one may expect the "necessary and
proper" clause 71 to support congressional action in the consumer
credit field. Of course, it will still be necessary to show that the
congressional act was "necessary and proper," in the constitu-
tional sense, to some specifically authorized congressional func-
tion.
If the constitutionality of the Truth in Lending Act should
be tested, we cannot predict the context of the proceeding. How-
ever, anyone seeking to invalidate the Act must be careful to
avoid jumping from the frying pan into the fire. It should be
pointed out that the Act invalidates inconsistent state statutes.77
Although the FRB has authorized a method for creditors to
make "inconsistent" state disclosures in a prescribed way if they
wish,71 this is generally cumbersome and pointless, and most
creditors have elected to give only the CCPA disclosures, relying
on the supremacy of federal law to eliminate inconsistent state
material. Should the Truth in Lending Act be found unconstitu-
tional, its power to supplant inconsistent state law presumably
also falls, and creditors may then find themselves in automatic
violation of the then revivified state requirements.
V
CCPA OBEISANCE TO STATE LAW
To appreciate the CCPA today, one must recall the atmos-
phere of 1967 and 1968 when its final versions were being drafted.
For years the creditor community had opposed a federal dis-
closure law. Of course, the requirement of exposing the simple
annual interest rate in the same manner for all consumer credit
75 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406 (1819).
-6 U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cd. 18.
77 CCPA § 111 (a), 15 U.S.C. § 1610 (a) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
78 55 Fed. Res. Bull. 98 (1969).
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transactions, which was the essence of Senator Douglas' and,
later, Senator Proxmire's proposals, was anathema to many tra-
ditional lenders. This was not based on the lenders' belief that
their rates were too high, but rather on the concern that a gener-
ally uninformed public might think they were. Almost as dis-
turbing as this, however, was the concept of passing control from
the states to the Federal Government. The traditions of state
dominance described in the opening pages of this article were
deep-seated, and opposition existed almost as much to the specter
of federal presence as to the substantive provisions of any law
that might be enacted.
As a result of this attitude, the CCPA developed the under-
lying philosophy that if a state's law satisfactorily performed
CCPA functions, the state would be exempted from the federal
requirements and would be left under its own law. The FRB was
given the power to make this determination as follows:
The Board shall by regulation exempt from the requirements of
this part any class of credit transactions within any State if it
determines that under the law of that State that class of trans-
actions is subject to requirements substantially similar to those
imposed under this part, and that there is adequate provision for
enforcement. 79
It seemed clear in the months after the Truth in Lending
Act became effective that the FRB was satisfied that power
under the Act was properly delegated to it and the other federal
agencies empowered to administer and enforce the CCPA. In-
formal expressions of opinion from the FRB and its staff led
one to believe that state exemptions would be granted very
sparingly, if at all. State laws and enforcement mechanisms were
obviously going to be scrutinized with microscopic intensity, and
it appeared unlikely that an exemption would be granted absent
some forceful political pressure on the FRB to return authority
to the states80
The first application for exemption was made by Maine in
September 1969. This was followed by applications from Con-
necticut, Massachusetts, Oklahoma, Virginia and Utah. To the
surprise of the credit industry, Maine was awarded an exemp-
79 CCPA § 123, 15 U.S.C. § 1633 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). A similar provision
exists for the garnishment provisions in § 305, with the power exercisable by the
Labor Department rather than the FRB. Id. § 305, 15 U.S.C. § 1675 (1964). There
is no equivalent in Title II, Extortionate Credit Transactions. Supplement II to
FRB Reg. Z specifies the manner in which a state may apply for the CCPA § 123
exemption. 55 Fed. Res. Bull. 98 (1969).
SO It should be noted that CCPA § 123, 15 U.S.C. 1633 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968)
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tion on March 12, 1970.81 Whether political pressure was in fact
applied to the FRB must remain a secret reserved to the Board
and its staff. Maine's exemption, however, was not greeted with
the enthusiasm that might have been expected from many of the
original supporters of the exemption concept. In the months
between July 1969 and March 1970 operations under the Truth
in Lending Act, while not without problems, had been found
curiously palatable. Getting a grasp of the new statute plus its
supporting regulations and FRB interpretations, as well as chang-
ing forms and procedures for the July deadline had been just as
onerous a task as one had anticipated. Once accomplished, how-
ever, the experience of abiding by one federal law of disclosure
rather than fifty state laws with fifty different sets of require-
ments was a refreshing change for the consumer credit lawyer.
The desire that control return to state law had lost its urgency.
Some felt that creditor opinion had shifted to full support for
federal control. While this is probably an overstatement, and a
significant group of credit industry representatives continued to
press for state preemption, the benefits of working under federal
law were apparent. Hence the reversion to state law was not
deemed an unmixed blessing.
With Maine's grant of an exemption, we now have a situa-
tion in which to test the effects of this proceedure. One finds the
following with regard to Maine:
1. All disclosure requirements for consumer credit trans-
actions are governed by Maine law which is almost, but not pre-
cisely, identical to the Truth in Lending Law. - Thus the concept
of individual state variation has been reintroduced.
2. Advertising requirements applicable to consumer credit
transactions continue to be governed by federal law, although the
disclosures to be given in an actual transaction are subject to
Maine law. Through what is possibly a drafting oversight, the
federal exemption provision (CCPA Section 123) provides ex-
emption only from the requirements of "this part," which means
part 2 of the Truth in Lending Act.63 Since advertising is covered
by part 3, no state exemption for this activity is possible. Argu-
ments have been made to the FRB that as part of its rulemaking
gives no discretion to the FRB. If the elements required by § 123 are found to
exist, the Board is required to grant the exemption.
81 BNA Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. No. 453, at A-23 (Mar. 17, 1970).
82 For example, in calculating a 3 "business day" period upon which a right
of rescission for certain real estate transactions is based, Maine adds Patriot's Day
(Apr. 19) to the list provided by the FRB.
83 See text accompanying note 79 supra.
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power under the Act, Congress specifically gave it the right to"provide for such adjustments and exceptions for any class of
transactions, as in the judgment of the Board are necessary or
proper to effectuate the purposes of this subchapter."84 This, the
argument runs, gives the FRB the power to exempt advertising
in part 3 as well as the disclosure requirements of part 2. The
FRB has not, however, been persuaded. Having exempted Maine,
therefore, it has necessarily retained control over advertising,
leaving the remainder of the Truth in Lending Act to the state.
At best, the exemption results in dual, rather than single, control.
3. The Maine exemption is conditional as any exemption
granted to a state must be. Its continuation depends upon: s'
a. continuing amendment or revision of Maine law, in-
cluding regulations and interpretations thereof, as
may be necessary to "preserve substantial similarity
with the Truth in Lending Act and regulation Z as
they may be amended, and with interpretations
thereof"6 which may be issued from time to time by
the Board";
b. continuing adequacy of the Maine provisions for en-
forcement, and
c. cooperation and appropriate liaison with the FRB to
assure that the purposes of the Truth in Lending Act
are carried out uniformly.1s
It is certain that there will be changes in regulation Z and
the interpretations thereof. What steps will be called for to en-
sure Maine's continuing compliance and what steps will be re-
quired should compliance cease (is independent FRB action re-
quired, or does the exemption automatically end when the
conditions are no longer satisfied?) are questions yet to be an-
swered. It is therefore clear that the federal exemption has not
resolved all the issues relating to the control of consumer credit
disclosure regulations.
4. Actions based upon violations of the Truth in Lending
Act may be brought in any United States district court.ss Viola-
b4 CCPA § 105, 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968) (emphasis added).
'5 Supplement II to FRB Reg. Z. 55 Fed. Res. Bull. 605-08 (1969).
SO Interpretations are issued and revised on a fairly regular basis. See Fed.
Res. Doc. No. 70-4112 (filed Apr. 3, 1970), an interpretation issued by the FRB21 days after the Maine exemption became effective. On Apr. 13, the Board pro-
posed certain amendments to its regulations under the Act, relating to the dis-
closure of default charges.87 The standards for this liaison are contained in Supp. II, para. (e) of
Reg. Z. 55 Fed. Res. Bull. 607 (1969).88 CCPA § 130 (e), 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (e) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
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tions of Maine law alone would not normally support federal
jurisdiction. However, to retain federal jurisdiction in the manner
Congress apparently intended, the Board has ruled that a state
exemption will not apply to the civil liability provisions of the
CCPA. 9 This means that a violation of Maine disclosure law
may be asserted in federal court as tantamount to a violation of
federal law. However, since Maine law may, and does, contain
disclosure requirements in excess of the CCPA requirements,
violation of that excess area alone will not support a federal
action.
As previously noted, the applications of five more states
await FRB decision. We have no idea at this time what their
determination will be. In view of the Maine experience, the likeli-
hood of further state exemptions seems much stronger than it did
in July 1969. The four complications created with respect to the
Maine exemption are, of course, all arguments against further
state exemptions. To those four must be added the numerous
complications arising in our federal system from differing laws in
the various states. Since the states that have submitted applica-
tions do not have identical laws, undoubtedly the variations-and
the attendant conflicts problems-will increase in ratio, possibly
geometric ratio, to the exempted states.
The countervailing position is that state law provides a
better vehicle for consumer credit than federal law. Before pur-
suing this approach, some comment about the Uniform Consumer
Credit Code (UCCC) is in order.
VI
THE UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE AND
THE STATE POSITION
The most significant state attempt to counter entry by the
Federal Government into the field of consumer credit was the
drafting and approval by the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws of the UCCCY0 Begun as a formal
project in 1963 through the appointment by the National Con-
ference of a Special Committee on Retail Installment Sales,
Consumer Credit, Small Loans and Usury, the UCCC is designed
as a sweeping and detailed statute governing virtually all aspects
of consumer credit. It replaces state usury laws insofar as those
89 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(c) (1969).
90 The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ap-
proved-the UCCC on July 30, 1968, and the House of Delegates of the American
Bar Association did so on Aug. 7, 1968.
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laws relate to loans or other forms of credit9 ' and establishes a
comprehensive system regulating consumer credit sales, loans,
revolving credit including the various credit card plans and the
related areas of administration, licensing, insurance, remedies
and penalties.
Despite widespread opposition to the UCCC, it is, in this
writer's judgment, a careful and balanced document reflecting the
needs of both the creditor and debtor communities. It is the only
document of its size and scope that has received the best that all
interested parties could offer. The final result is the product of
years of careful research and diligent effort. While no one is in
entire agreement with the end product, some dissatisfaction is
almost a necessary function of the diversity of interests that
pooled their thoughts and compromised their views to reach ulti-
mate agreement. As a result, at least part of the current opposition
to the UCCC stems from the very process by which it was
drafted.
The UCCC was drafted in recognition of the fact that the
state laws governing the broad field of consumer credit were an
unduly complex, inconsistent and inadequate body of law. A
fundamental purpose of the UCCC is "to simplify, clarify and
modernize the law governing retail instalment sales, consumer
credit, small loans and usury. '"'2 Whether or not uniformity is an
important objective in consumer credit law, a point on which
reasonable men differ, there is little argument over the need for
modernization, simplification and clarification.
At the time work on the UCCC began, it was taken entirely
for granted that consumer credit law was state law. No conflict
with the Federal Government existed, and none was anticipated.
The objective of the Commissioners was to create the best pos-
sible body of law for uniform enactment at the state level.
Toward the end of the drafting process, however, the CCPA was
becoming a reality, and the new concept of federal preemption
became an added consideration.
The National Conference of Commissioners is composed of
lawyers appointed by the governors of the several states. 3 The
National Conference is, therefore, a body whose primary purpose
and function is state rather than federal law. While there is
Ol In addition to credit transactions, state usury laws also apply to unpaid
judgements, notes, other obligations and to cases where there is no agreed rate
or no agreement is possible. See UCCC § 9.103, Explanatory Note.
92 UCCC § 1.102(2)(a).
93 The New York appointment procedure is contained in N.Y. Exec. Law
§ 165 (McKinney Supp. 1969).
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nothing in the charter of the National Conference or in the nature
of the appointment of individual commissioners to favor state
over federal law, it is natural that there should be an emphasis on
state law. One would expect that, offered a choice between state
or federal law on a given subject, the general inclination of the
National Conference would be toward legislation at the state
level. This would clearly be more pronounced in an area such as
consumer credit where federal law will necessarily displace an
already existing state dominance.
When it became apparent that exemption from a new body
of federal law could be obtained through a substantially com-
parable body of state law, the reaction of the National Confer-
ence was predictable. The disclosure requirements of the UCCC
were drafted to conform as closely as possible to the disclosure
provisions of the Truth in Lending Act in order to achieve the
maximum likelihood of obtaining state exemptions pursuant to
CCPA Section 123 and action thereunder by the FRB. Even the
approval given by the full National Conference to the final draft
of the UCCC in 1968 contained an authorization to amend it in
order to retain comparability with the regulations and interpreta-
tions under the Truth in Lending Act. 4 This process of amend-
ment has, in fact, continued since that original 1968 approval.
The UCCC is, of course, much broader in scope than the
CCPA. Enactment by the states was expected not only to obtain
exemption from federal law but also to introduce an improved
body of consumer credit law. The controversial nature of the
UCCC was well known to its draftsmen, and their expectation of
controversy has been more than fulfilled. In one area, however,
developments have been surprising. It was expected that the
natural desire of the states to obtain exemption from federal law
would offer a powerful impetus to adoption of the UCCC in full.
As states under the UCCC obtained FRB exemption, it was
anticipated that others would desire the same beneficial freedom
from federal law. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, the consumer
credit industry achieved an unexpected satisfaction under the
unified federal requirements of the Truth in Lending Act."'
Suddenly, achieving state exemption from this simplified pattern
and returning to the variegated pattern of state regulation did not
appear the great benefit it had, not too long previously, been
considered. There are even those who would now characterize this
return to the state law system as movement in the wrong direc-
94 UCCC, Prefatory Notes, at 9.
05 See Part V supra.
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tion. Of course, official polls on this issue have not been taken.
Whether or not the majority of the consumer credit industry
prefers the return to state law is a question that cannot be
answered at this time. What is clear is that the benefits of federal
exemption no longer constitute a compelling reason to adopt the
UCCC. Supporting evidence may be found in the fact that only
Oklahoma, Utah and the territory of Guam have enacted the
UCCC.
In the period since the National Conference of Commis-
sioners approved the UCCC, one cannot observe any momentum
developing in favor of the Code's adoption. At the same time,
those opposed to the UCCC on policy grounds have not altered
their position. The most vocal opposition groups are those who
purport to speak for the consumer. By dint of the growing interest
among the bar and the law schools in representing the consumer,
this group has grown in size. Opposition to the UCCC has cor-
respondingly increased. In 1968, a relatively new consumer voice,
the National Consumer Law Center, affiliated with Boston College
Law School, drafted a "competing" code, titled the National
Consumer Act. This has not yet been adopted in any state, but
its very presence stands as an impediment to enactment of the
UCCC. The National Consumer Act, in adopting the disclosure
provisions of the Truth in Lending Act by reference, seems also
to have afforded itself the opportunity to obtain the CCPA
federal exemption. One is, however, struck by use of the word
"National" in the title and cannot help but speculate whether its
draftsmen had in mind something other than state legislation.
It is now doubtful that the UCCC will have any real success
at the state level. Certainly there will be no immediate ground-
swell of state adoption. It is worthy of note, however, that two
significant commissions have now been established to study the
UCCC, one in the District of Columbia and the other in New
York. Any legislative action in the District must, of course, be
taken by Congress and will have a substantial effect upon the
rest of the country. Those acquainted with the history of the
Uniform Commercial Code will also appreciate the significant role
the New York Law Revision Commission (the body delegated
to conduct the New York study) has played in the passage of
uniform legislation. It was the three-year study by this Commis-
sion of the Uniform Commercial Code that broke the log jam
stalling that legislation. After the Commission's report, most of
its recommendations were accepted by the National Conference
of Commissioners through amendments to the Code. The Uniform
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Commercial Code soon thereafter became the law of 49 states."
It seems clear that in evaluating the UCCC, the Law Revision
Commission and the District of Columbia Commission will con-
sider the proposals of the National Consumer Act and those of
other interested groups. The ultimate result may well be an
amalgam of a number of source materials.
VII
CONSUMER CREDIT LAW ALTERNATIVE
The foregoing analysis invites a prediction as to which of
several legislative paths future consumer credit legislation will
take. Given the manifest importance of the field, there will be
considerable legislative action. Essentially, there appear to be
three alternatives:
1. Consumer credit could continue in its present form and
remain basically a creature of individual state creation. As has
been pointed out, consumer credit law is still largely state law
despite the new federal presence.
2. The states could retain their dominance in consumer
credit but institute a more harmonious pattern for the existing
tangle of laws. That is, we could have uniform state legislation.
3. Uniformity could be established at the federal level with
one body of consumer credit law as the law of the land.
The existing pattern of state law is almost certainly un-
satisfactory. For many years, state credit laws have grown hap-
hazardly in response to the pressures of particular times, and,
today, they present a complexity and obscurity that is hardly
warranted by the field itself. As an illustration, credit in New
York State is now granted largely under the following:
1. The General Usury Law.97 To the extent not specifically
covered by other laws, interest on extensions of credit in New
York are limited by this law to 7.5 per cent simple interest.
2. The Small Loan LawY8 This law authorizes consumer
loans to be made by licensed lenders in amounts up to $800 at
rates which go as high as 30 per cent for low balance loans.
3. New York Banks and Trust Companies. A special law
permits state banks and trust companies, when certificated by the
Banking Department, to make loans at "discount" rates of 6
96 Only 'Louisiana has yet to adopt the Code. The work of the Law Revision
Commission is described in Report of Commission on Uniform State Laws to
Legislature of the State of New York. N.Y. UCC XVII (McKinney 1964).
97 N.Y. Gen. Obligations Law §§ 5-501 to -531 (McKinney 1964).98 N.Y. Banking Law §§ 340-65 (McKinney 1950).
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per cent, which can translate into over 13 per cent simple
interest10
4. New York State Credit Unions. These institutions may
lend to their members at a rate of 1 per cent per month (ap-
proximately 12 per cent per year actuarially or, alternatively, at
a 6 per cent discount computed in the manner allowed state
banks."" Federal credit unions are restricted to a 1 per cent per
month rate. 10'
5. Retail Instalment Sales Act.'0 2 Sellers of most goods
except automobiles and those who sell services on time, in both
cases for non-commercial purposes, are subject to the specific
rates and other controlling provisions of this Act.
6. Motor Vehicle Retail Instalment Sales Act. 03 Sales of
motor vehicles, again limited to non-commercial purposes, are
governed by this Act which has many provisions analogous to
the Retail Instalment Sales Act mentioned above.
7. Loans to Corporations. °4 Under a special amendment to
the general usury laws, loans to corporations, except in certain
limited cases, are exempt from rate ceilings.
S. The Time-Price Doctrine 0° But for this doctrine, which
essentially holds that the cost of buying on time is not the sort
of loan or forbearance to which the usury laws apply, many sales
not otherwise specifically authorized by the sort of statutes de-
scribed above in items 5 and 6 might be subject to the rate control
contained in the general usury laws, laws which are economically
unsuited for widespread credit.00
These New York examples are typical of the national
picture. Each state has its own set of laws available to control the
granting of credit. Special laws exist in other states applicable to
the home repair business, the second mortgage loan business,
90 N.Y. Banking Law § 108(4) (McKinney Supp. 1969). As noted in text
accompanying note 24 supra, national banks are accorded the same authorizationthrough the incorporation of state rates, by reference, into the powers of national
banks.
1",o N.Y. Banking Law § 453(5) (McKinney Supp. 1969).
101 12 U.S.C. § 1757(5) (1964).
102 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law §§ 401-19 (McKinney 1962); id. §§ 420-21 (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1969).
103 Id. f§ 301-12 (McKinney 1962); id. § 313 (McKinney Supp. 1969).
104 N.Y. Gen. Obligations Law § 5-521 (McKinney Supp. 1969).
105 See Mandelino v. Fribourg, 23 N.Y.2d 145, 242 N.E.2d 823, 295 N.Y.S.2d
654 (196S); Flatbush Auto Discount Corp. v. McCarthy-Bernhardt Buick, Inc.,
9 N.Y.2d 776, 174 N.E.2d 749, 215 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1961); Brooks v. Avery, 4 N.Y.
225 (1850).
1(6 See Felsenfeld, Consumer Interest Rates: A Public Learning Process, 23
Bus. Law. 931 (1968).
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commercial (as contrasted with consumer) instalment selling and
numerous other related fields.'
Stemming largely from the fact that these laws were gen-
erally designed for special circumstances, they have often become
outdated and inadequate to achieve their purpose despite their
number. For example, the usury law in New York remained at 6
per cent for years after that rate was clearly unsatisfactory, and
devices had to be invented to circumvent its artificial ceiling.'
Additionally, the relatively new credit card devices are suffering
because of legal confusion as to which body of state credit law is
controlling (does a credit card reflect a deferred payment sale or
a loan?). 1°9 Some states, including New York, have relatively
sophisticated statutes for this purpose ° but many do not. Judg-
ing from the existing state practice of enacting legislation to deal
with problems as they arise, one may expect additional difficulty
as new forms of credit continue to create legal issues to which
the existing statutes have questionable application.
It is also apparent that as certain types of credit tend to
become concentrated under a few national systems and consumer
mobility continues to expand, the conflict of laws issues that
necessarily attend variations in state law will become more
difficult.' State lines have a clearly diminishing relationship to
marketing habits. Selecting the law applicable to such a trans-
action is more than a perplexing legal problem. The mere exis-
tence of several bodies of law inhibits the lay consumer's under-
standing of the legal system to which he is subject."12 These
conflicting state legal systems, in their tendency to confuse the
107 See Home Solicitation Sales Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 42-134 (1958);
Home Improvement Law, Md. Ann. Code art. 56, § 245 (1964); Secondary Mort-
gage Loan Act of 1965, ch. 91, § 6, N.J. Acts 125. See also Benfield, Money,
Mortgages and Migraine-The Usury Headache, 19 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 819,
835-52 (1968).
108 "Points" in real estate loans is one example. Under the Truth in Lending
Act, points must be considered as a finance charge and included in computing the
interest charge. CCPA § 106 (a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (Supp. IV, 1965-
1968).
109 See Dennis v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 446 S.W.2d 260 (Tenn. 1969) ; State v.
J.C. Penney Co., No. 125-287 (Dane County Ct., Wis. 1969).
110 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 413 (McKinney 1962).
111 A number of these problems are discussed in James, The Effects of Federal
Due Process of Law and Full Faith and Credit Limitations on a Forum State
Using Its Public Policy to Negate Parties' Autonomy in the Validity of Conflict-
of-Laws Contracts, 41 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 1 (1964); Note, Usury in the Conflict
of Laws: The Doctrine of the Lex Debitoris, 55 Cal. L. Rev. 123 (1967). See also
People v. Fairfax Family Fund, Inc., 235 Cal. App. 2d 881, 47 Cal. Rptr. 812
(1964), appeal dismissed, 382 U.S. 1 (1965).
112 A primary purpose of the Truth in Lending Act is to encourage the
"informed use of credit." CCPA § 102, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
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public and the bar, must be considered to have a inhibiting effect
on the consumer's understanding of the credit market.
Obviously, the problems that result when consumer credit
is controlled by local law are only part of the picture. The
credit system would not have grown with its obvious vitality had
there not been a real utility to the existence of these laws at the
state level. Several policy reasons are usually given to justify
state rather than federal legislation.
The first is the ability of local laws to meet the particular
needs of local problems. Law students are taught early that the
law of riparian rights in dry Arizona requires a different set of
legal standards from those applicable to the Louisiana bayous.
Whether this is applicable to the credit market is a controversial
issue. This writer has never been convinced that the needs of the
consumer credit economy showed regional variation. It is incon-
testable that the poor and the ignorant need legal protections
that differ from those available to the affluent and the informed.
Rate structures or default practices applicable to low balance
transactions are subject to considerations that may not apply to
high balance credits. Much contemporary legislation, including
the UCCC,1"3 has acknowledged this principle. Indeed, the ap-
proach of the entire Truth in Lending Act, whose coverage (ex-
clusive of real estate transactions) does not apply to credit trans-
actions in excess of $25,000,114 recognizes the difference in law
between the small transaction and the large.
This is a far different assertion from one that the middle
class borrower in Phoenix needs a different sort of legal structure
from his income counterpart in New Orleans. There has been
ample opportunity under existing state law to observe whether
there is any particular correlation between locale and legal
structure. Clearly there are different credit patterns in different
states. However, these would seem to be the result, rather than
the cause, of existing legal patterns; there is no convincing ev-
idence that the patterns result from particular need. Individual
state need does not now serve as a powerful argument for pre-
serving individual state law in the field of consumer credit.
The opposite is true, however, for a second traditional de-
fense of laws at the state level. Legislation always represents
something of a trial-and-error approach to problem solving. The
113 See UCCC § 5.103 restricting the right of a creditor to claim a deficiency
against a retail buyer only in cases where the cash price of the goods sold was
$1000 or less.
114 CCPA § 104 (3), 15 U.S.C. § 1603 (3) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
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individual state is a more appropriate subdivision than the
country at large for this process. Therefore, as legal devices are
proven improper or inadequate, the state legislatures offer a
much more convenient instrument for correction than the ponder-
ous legislative machinery of Congress. Flexibility to make easy
adjustments in the law has considerable appeal in relation to
consumer credit legal controls. Furthermore the passage of con-
troversial legislation is more likely at the state level. This is
important in the consumer credit field where there is compara-
tively little agreement on the course legislation should take. The
current intense controversy over the UCCC is a dramatic illustra-
tion of this lack of consensus. While a difference of opinion, even
a violent difference, is not a conclusive reason for legislation at
the state rather than the federal level, it does serve to illustrate
this particular advantage of the state system.
This process of change and experimentation at the state level
in consumer credit regulation is readily observable. While the
Federal Government was arguing the merits of simple annual
interest disclosure over a period of years,"15 several states enacted
this type of law with a minimum of difficulty. Changes in state
rate structures 116 as well as passage of sweeping credit reforms'17
are considerably more feasible on the state rather than the na-
tional level. Furthermore, this state process of adjustment is
clearly a continuous one."'
Another argument supporting state rather than federal legis-
lation is that, for a field involving a multitude of small trans-
actions, administration and examination on the local level can be
conducted more effectively through state than through federal
officers. This is not, it should be noted, an issue of judicial en-
forcement so much as administrative supervision. Concurrent
jurisdiction for violations of federal law can exist in state and
115 On Senator Douglas' efforts to have a truth in lending law enacted, see
his testimony included in Hearings on S. 5 Before the Subcomm. on Financial
Institutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967). The first bill may have been S. 1740, introduced in 1961.
116 The New York general interest rate contained in Gen. Obligations Law
§ 5-501 (McKinney 1964) was increased from 6% to a rate to be prescribed by
the banking board not to exceed 7.5% in 1968.
117 Perhaps the most significant of which were the recent enactments by
Oklahoma and Utah of the UCCC. Okla. Stat. tit. 14A, § 1-101 (Supp. 1969);
Utah Code Ann. tit. 70B, § 1-101 (Supp. 1969).
118 The New York legislature has numerous bills before it regulating various
aspects of consumer credit including garnishment (A. 5972), the "holder in due
course doctrine" (A. 5966), creation of a Consumer Protection Board (A. 6301),
prohibition against wage assignments (A. 5971), unsolicited credit card controls
(S. 8402) and class actions (S. 6147, A. 1084). 193d Reg. Sess. (1970).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
CONSUMER CREDIT LAW
federal courts. But whether administrative machinery for daily
control of the credit business rests better in state or federal hands
is another question.
Regarding this point, administrators have probably offered
a better device for control over illegal consumer credit practices
than courts. Given the small dollar amounts involved in most of
these credit transactions, there is usually little incentive for the
consumer debtor to discover violations or to pursue his remedy
in the courts. Administrators, however, charged with the re-
sponsibility of constantly reviewing local credit practices can
and do exhibit concern over small as well as large violations. 119
Corrective administrative action has served more effectively as
both a deterrent force and a remedial instrument than judicial
action in consumer credit transactions. At the present time, how-
ever, we are witnessing some shift of emphasis toward the courts.
As more lawyers are devoting themselves to "poverty law," a
term newly coined in the past few years for a separate field of
law which had not theretofore existed, the small consumer is
receiving more and better representation. In addition, as lawyers
learn the potency of the class action in consumer credit litigation,
lawsuits even take on an unexpected financial appeal.
If it results that federal credit legislation is better than
that of the states and that state administration is more effective
than that of the Federal Government, it may be that state ad-
ministrators should be empowered to administer federal credit
law at the state level. This approach is constructive, but its com-
plexities are beyond the scope of this article. It is necessary only
to mention in passing the obvious problem of financing the opera-
tion at the state level and the state constitutional problem of in-
corporating by reference another (federal) law, including its
future amendments and interpretations into state law.
However, one can observe an increasing cooperation between
federal groups empowered to administer the Truth in Lending
Act and state administrators already involved with the local
operations of the consumer credit industry. Questionnaires have
been prepared for use at the state level to determine the degree
of compliance with the new federal laws, and numerous informal
liaisons have been established between representatives of federal
agencies, particularly the FTC, and state loan administrators.
119 Beneficial Fin. Co. v. State Adm'r of Loan Laws, No. 9-082369 (Baltimore
City Ct., Md. Jan. 8, 1970) illustrates an excess of administrative zeal in the small
loan area. A $418 loan was held entirely void because of an inadvertent error of
3V, in computing interest.
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Nevertheless, such joint activity emphasizes the underlying weak-
ness that is an inherent part of the state legal system.
VIII
FEDERAL PRESENCE
Whether one approves or not, federal consumer credit law is
a reality, and there is every indication that its scope will increase.
Experience under the major foray into state dominance of con-
sumer credit, the Truth in Lending Act, has been limited but, as
indicated earlier, far from disastrous. There has been little if
any change in consumer behavior because of the Act,'20 but time
has been too short to permit any substantial feedback. Ap-
proximately ten class actions have been brought against creditors
who allegedly violated the disclosure requirements of the Act.
Two indictments have been obtained charging criminal viola-
tions, each stemming from an employer's failure to give the re-
quired information to his employees.12 1 The Truth in Lending Act
must be seen, however, as part of a pattern of increasing federal
presence.
A recent statute that has not received the public attention
it deserves is the Federal Credit Control Act.122 This empowers
the President, after his determination that such action is neces-
sary or appropriate for the purpose of preventing or controlling
inflation, to direct the FRB to regulate and control any extension
of credit. The Board's regulatory authority is virtually without
limit. The Act specifically authorizes the setting of maximum
interest rates, the control of maturities, down payments and re-
payment schedules, the establishment of loan ratios for both
debtors and creditors, the licensing of credit grantors and con-
tains a general conclusory power authorizing the Board to "pro-
hibit or limit any extensions of credit under any circumstances
the Board deems appropriate."' 23 Theoretically, it seems entirely
possible to enact the UCCC (or the National Consumer Act)
under these Presidential and FRB powers. However, present
indications are that these powers will probably remain un-
exercised.
Other significant items of legislation affecting consumer
120 Felsenfeld, supra note 31, at 234.
121 The indictment is against 2 officers of the Metropolitan Sanitation Co.,
Omaha, Neb. Consumer Trends, Mar. 1, 1970, at 24.
122 Pub. L. No. 91-151, 83 Stat. 371 (1969).
123 Id. § 206, 83 Stat. 378.
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credit directly or indirectly are pending before Congress in vary-
ing stages of consideration:
1. The Consumer Representation Act 124 is designed to
establish an Office of Consumer Affairs in the Executive Office of
the President, with a head of cabinet rank, and to establish a
separate Consumer Advisory Council.
2. The Consumer Protection Act 12 is designed to increase
the powers of the FTC and the Department of Justice to combat
unfair or deceptive practices and to permit consumer suits based
upon prior successful governmental actions.
3. The Community Credit Expansion Act126 is a lengthy
and complex piece of legislation whose major purpose is to ar-
range for low cost credit to residents of poverty areas. Among its
features is the establishment of nationally chartered National
Development Banks with functions tied to the needs of poverty
areas. Certain classes of consumer credit would be 80 per cent
guaranteed by the Federal Government.
4. Two major proposals for expanded class action juris-
diction in the federal courts based upon consumer complaints
without regard to the amount in controversy are receiving serious
consideration. An administration bill provides jurisdiction only
after a prior successful governmental action; another bill simply
contains a grant of jurisdiction for certain specified actions.'27
5. The Fair Credit Reporting Act,12S which has passed the
Senate, provides controls over the operation of credit reporting
agencies. Based upon a human concern over both the fallibility
and the infinite memory of computers, the bill provides in part
for the expunging of certain types of adverse information after
specified time periods.
6. Various other bills are designed in one way or another
to prevent the uncontrolled spread of credit cards.12 9 Simul-
taneously, the FTC has issued regulations curbing the mailing of
unsolicited cards. 13°
7. Considerable congressional attention is being given to
124 S. 3240, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
125 S. 3201, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
126 S. 2146, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969). Hearings were held on Jan. 14, 1970.
127 S. 3092, S. 3201 and H.R. 15066, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) among other
pending class action bills.128 S. 323, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). A similar bill, H.R. 16340, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1970), was introduced in the House.
29 See H.R. 15103, H.R. 15190, H.R. 16542 (which has been approved by
the House Post Office and Civil Service Committee) and S. 721, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1969). The last gives the FRE regulatory control over the problem.
130 34 Fed. Reg. 7661 (1969).
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possible abuse in certain insurance fields that relate to consumer
credit. In particular, there is movement for a national ceiling on
the charge that may be imposed in consumer credit transactions
for credit life insurance.'13
There is as yet no proposal for anything as sweeping on the
national scene as the UCCC. One has no doubt at this time, how-
ever, that federal lawmakers have not found this to be forbidden
ground. Statutes and bills of the type now before Congress must
be considered indicative of things to come.-
IX
CONCLUSION
Presently, we are at a crucial stage in the development of
state-federal relations in the law of consumer credit. Initiative
is moving from the states to the Federal Government. The Truth
in Lending Act is the first major move into this hitherto state-
dominated field. The presence of the National Commission on
Consumer Finance and the introduction of numerous consumer
bills in Congress indicate further impetus in the federal direction.
In contrast, the UCCC is an influence for the retention of
state supremacy. Added to this is the possibility of state exemp-
tion from direct regulation by the Truth in Lending Act when
comparable state legislation exists. This state oriented influence
was given unexpected vitality with the actual exemption of
Maine.
However, the momentum seems to favor increased federal
presence. This has been assisted to no small degree by the un-
expected general satisfaction experienced by the creditor com-
munity in being able to substitute the disclosure requirements of
one national jurisdiction for those of fifty states.' It seems
probable that the expanding group of consumer representatives
finds the public awareness of a national consumer law more
beneficial to consumer understanding and a greater stimulus to
consumer action than the scores of unrelated laws that had
governed the area in the past.
The growing acceptance of federal consumer law is seen in
the expressions of diverse groups with interests in the develop-
ment of this field of law. A resolution of the AFL-CIO Executive
131 Consumer Credit Insurance Act, S. 1754, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
132 Consumer Trends, Apr. 1, 1970, at 14, reports that 122 consumer bills
have been introduced in this session of Congress.
133 Note may also be made of a growing state movement to incorporate the
federal truth-in-lending requirements by reference and make compliance with fed-
eral law an automatic compliance with state law.
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Council at its 1969 annual meeting provided, in part: "We believe
that Congress should undertake certain key reforms [in con-
sumer credit] as a matter of federal law."' 34 In addition the
following resolution was adopted by the Tennessee Legislature:
Be it resolved by the House of Representatives of the eighty-sixth General Assembly of the State of Tennessee, the Senateconcurring, That the United States Congress is urged to give se-rious consideration to enacting uniform, nationwide maximuminterest rates for different classifications of loans or lenders or
both.13 5
The concept of a national usury law, a national credit code,
the federal licensing of consumer lenders and finance companies
and the general federal administration of the consumer credit
laws is not entirely unexplored. The idea is still revolutionary,
but it does not appear as extraordinary as it did a year ago.
134 AFL-CIO Resolution No. 228, Book 3, at 75 (1969).
135 Tenn. H.J. Res. No. 48, Feb. 2, 1970.
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